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INTRODUCTION 
t is an all too common scenario: a blogger criticizes someone online 
and then is sued for his or her statements. While a number of 
defenses against these kinds of actions exist (the statement is true, the 
statement is obviously rhetorical hyperbole, etc.), defamation 
defenses only come into play once the lawsuit has commenced and 
require both time and money to assert. All too often, these lawsuits 
are filed solely to silence a voice of criticism and deprive individuals 
of their First Amendment rights. As the Internet expands and more 
individuals have the ability to express themselves online, the need to 
protect this Internet-based speech from strategic litigation against 
public participation—or SLAPP1 suits—becomes increasingly 
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important. For this reason, I believe we must adopt a national anti-
SLAPP law in order to create a unified and cohesive standard to 
protect free speech. 
As it currently stands, many states have many different laws 
discussing SLAPP suits. California and Oregon have some of the 
best-known and best-tested statutes in the nation.2 These statutes stay 
other proceedings, preventing costly discovery, and entitle a 
prevailing anti-SLAPP defendant to costs and attorney’s fees.3 These 
standards discourage abusive plaintiffs from filing inappropriate 
lawsuits and provide defendants with the opportunity to protect their 
First Amendment rights and reduce their litigation exposure. Other 
states, like Florida and Nevada, have anemic statutes that are rarely, if 
ever, applicable, and limit their protections to narrow groups of 
people.4 The disparity between existing anti-SLAPP statutes, coupled 
with the number of states that have no anti-SLAPP laws at all, leads 
to a state of injustice where some Americans have protection for their 
online speech and others do not. All Americans should enjoy free 
speech—not just those who live in civilized states. 
I 
PROBLEMS CREATED BY DISPARATE LAWS 
Both Nevada and California have anti-SLAPP statutes. However, 
the laws of these two states are vastly different, forcing courts to 
reconcile those differences. Metabolic Research, Inc. v. Ferrell 
illustrates the disparity in states’ provisions for anti-SLAPP 
protections: 
On October 20, 2009, Scott J. Ferrell, an attorney practicing law in 
Orange County California, sent “demand letters” to Metabolic 
Research, Inc. (“Metabolic”), at its address in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
and to General Nutrition Centers, Inc. (“GNC”), at its address in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The demand letters purported to notify the 
 
1 While the acronym “SLAPP” arose from these suits’ nature and purpose, they possess 
a number of other common characteristics including: a disparity in resources between the 
plaintiff and the defendant; their adjudication in a jurisdiction that is inconvenient for the 
defendant; and, increasingly, the assertion of frivolous rights of publicity, copyright, and 
trademark claims over non-infringing or nominative uses of the plaintiff’s name. 
2 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.150–31.155 
(2011). 
3 While these staying provisions are applicable in state court, the application of state 
anti-SLAPP statutes is slightly diluted in federal court. This highlights the need for 
consistent, federal anti-SLAPP legislation. 
4 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295 (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.635–41.670 
(West 2011). 
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recipients that they had violated California Civil Code §§ 1750-
1756, the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), by 
falsely advertising the properties and potential benefits of a product 
named Stemulite, which they marketed as a natural fitness 
supplement. Ferrell represented that he was acting on behalf of 
Michael Campos, Thomas Hess, and Sarah Jordan, all of whom he 
alleged purchased Stemulite in California, in reliance on the 
supposed false advertising, and had not received the purported 
benefits.5 
Ferrell demanded that Metabolic and GNC “cease their false 
advertising of Stemulite,” identify purchasers of the substance, 
provide refunds to them all, disgorge profits from Stemulite sales, and 
implement a corrective advertising campaign.6 A failure to do so 
would be met with a lawsuit.7 
Metabolic did not cave. Instead, it sued Ferrell and the putative 
class he claimed to represent for extortion.8 Metabolic’s suit also 
included claims for “conspiracy to engage in racketeering, civil 
extortion, tortious interference with contract, and tortious interference 
with prospective economic relations, i.e., interfering with the 
agreement between Metabolic and GNC. Metabolic sought 
declaratory relief and punitive damages.”9 Ferrell sought to have the 
case dismissed under the Nevada anti-SLAPP statute.10 However, the 
motion was doubly useless. 
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada found 
that Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute covers only communications made 
“directly to a governmental agency.”11 The statute itself is already 
textually narrow, in that it could be interpreted to protect the right to 
petition,12 and not the right to free speech generally (like California, 
Oregon, Texas, Washington, and the District of Columbia’s anti-
SLAPP statutes).13 However, it seems that the District of Nevada 
further clipped the statute’s application by reading a restriction into 
the statute that is just not there. 
 





10 Id. at 798 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.660 (West 2011)). 
11 Id. 
12 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.660. 
13 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.16 (West 2012); D.C. CODE § 16-5502 (2012); OR. REV. 
STAT. §§ 31.150–31.155 (2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–27.011 
(West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.500–4.24.525 (West 2012). 
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The action was brought against Ferrell based upon a “good faith 
communication in furtherance of the right to petition.”14 The statute’s 
plain language, however, contains nothing that says a speaker’s “right 
to petition” is only activated if he or she is speaking directly to a 
government official.15 Mr. Ferrell felt the same way, so he appealed 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which 
showed us yet another grave weakness in Nevada’s anti-SLAPP 
statute: it does not provide for an interlocutory appeal. 
The Ninth Circuit compared California’s anti-SLAPP statute to 
Oregon’s by looking at a pair of Ninth Circuit decisions.16 In Englert 
v. MacDonell, the Ninth Circuit denied an appeal of an anti-SLAPP 
motion as a collateral order, because denials of a motion to strike 
under Oregon’s anti-SLAPP statute were not immediately 
appealable.17 The Oregon statute only provided immunity from 
liability, not immunity from suit, in a SLAPP.18 (Oregon has since 
repaired this glaring defect in its statute.)19 On the other hand, the 
Ninth Circuit recognized in Batzel v. Smith20 that denials of anti-
SLAPP motions under California’s statute are immediately 
appealable: 
In Batzel, we held that the denial of a motion to strike brought 
pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute satisfied the collateral 
order doctrine because the purpose of the California law was to 
provide citizens with a substantive immunity from suit. In reaching 
this conclusion, the court relied upon the fact that California’s law 
provided for immediate appeal in state court and legislative history 
demonstrating that “lawmakers wanted to protect speakers from the 
trial itself rather than merely from liability.” 
 In contrast, Englert held that Oregon’s failure to provide for an 
immediate appeal at that time indicated its legislature’s belief that 
the normal appeal process was adequate to vindicate the anti-
SLAPP right, which it in turn described as “a right to have the legal 
sufficiency of the evidence underlying the complaint reviewed by a 
nisi prius judge before a defendant is required to undergo the 
burden and expense of a trial.” The Englert court explained that 
“[i]t would simply be anomalous to permit an appeal from an order 
denying a motion to strike when Oregon was satisfied that the 
values underlying the remedy could be sufficiently protected by a 
 
14 Metabolic, 693 F.3d at 802. 
15 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.660. 
16 Metabolic, 693 F.3d at 799–802. 
17 Englert v. MacDonell, 551 F.3d 1099, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2009). 
18 Id. at 1107. 
19 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.150–31.155 (2012). 
20 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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trial judge’s initial review of the motion, followed by appellate 
review only after a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff.”21 
While discussing the differences between the two kinds of SLAPP 
statutes, the Ninth Circuit hinted that Judge Mahan’s decision might 
have been flawed22 while shoring up the position that it was improper 
to review the appeal before the district court reached a final 
judgment.23 
A few years before the Ninth Circuit decided the Metabolic case, 
the Nevada Supreme Court decided a very important case for its anti-
SLAPP statute: John v. Douglas County School District.24 After 
facing suspension for unprofessional conduct and sexual harassment, 
a school security officer filed a discrimination lawsuit against the 
school district.25 About a year later, the school district found out that 
the security officer had improperly obtained confidential student 
records and, following an investigation, terminated him.26 The school 
district then filed a special motion to dismiss the security officer’s 
discrimination suit under Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute. The Nevada 
Supreme Court upheld the district court’s dismissal, finding that the 
school district’s inquiry into the security officer’s record was 
appropriate.27 
In making its decision, the Nevada Supreme Court relied on 
precedent that appeared to make the state’s anti-SLAPP statute more 
powerful. As the court wrote, “Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute was 
enacted in 1993, shortly after California adopted its statute, and both 
statutes are similar in purpose and language.”28 “When determining 
whether Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute falls within this category, 
[courts should] consider California case law because California’s anti-
SLAPP statute is similar in purpose and language to Nevada’s anti-
SLAPP statute.”29 This lends further credence to the argument that 
the District of Nevada read Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute too 
narrowly in the Metabolic case. But, unfortunately for Mr. Ferrell, the 
 
21 Metabolic, 693 F.3d at 800 (citations omitted). 
22 Id. at 802. 
23 Id. at 803. 
24 John v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 219 P.3d 1276 (Nev. 2009). 
25 Id. at 1278–79. 
26 Id. at 1279. 
27 Id. at 1287. 
28 Id. at 1281. 
29 Id. at 1283. 
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Metabolic case is not about the substance of the statutes, but how they 
function procedurally. 
In Metabolic, the Ninth Circuit determined that “the right to an 
immediate appeal in state court” displayed a “major distinguishing 
feature between” the different anti-SLAPP statues.30 In Nevada, 
“where no statutory authority to appeal is granted, no right exists.”31 
Because Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute does not expressly provide for 
immediate appeal, the Ninth Circuit was “unpersuaded that the 
statute’s generalized reference to an appeal implicitly, or otherwise, 
confers an immediate right to appeal. Nevada based its anti-SLAPP 
statute on California’s law, and the legislature could have mirrored 
California’s unequivocal language concerning an immediate right to 
appeal had it intended to furnish one.”32 Instead, Nevada’s law 
provides that “[a] person who engages in a good faith communication 
in furtherance of the right to petition is immune from civil liability for 
claims based upon the communication.”33Assuming that the 
legislatures chose specific language and utilized the words “civil 
liability” rather than “lawsuit” or “trial,” the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
the legislature did not intend to provide freedom from suit under the 
statute.34 
The court then went on to list the ways that Ferrell, and other 
similarly situated defendants, might find justice. Despite the fact that 
Ferrell could not appeal at that point, the Ninth Circuit observed that 
he still had a potential award of fees and costs if he succeeded in 
presenting a defense to defamation later on.35 While this might be 
true, it is a small comfort to a defamation defendant if he cannot 
afford to litigate the matter for that long. The appellate court then 
moved on to discuss Rule 11,36 the laughable sanctions mechanism in 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Though Rule 11 sanctions 
against even the most outrageous filings are slightly more common 
than rainbow-colored unicorns, the court nevertheless attempted to 
placate defamation defendants: 
First, a litigant in federal court may ask the district court to certify 
and the court of appeals to accept an interlocutory appeal pursuant 
 
30 Metabolic Research, Inc. v. Ferrell, 693 F.3d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 2012). 
31 Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 678 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Nev. 1984). 
32 Metabolic, 693 F.3d at 801. 
33 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.650 (West 2011). 
34 Metabolic, 693 F.3d at 802. 
35 Id. 
36 FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
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to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) as involving controlling questions of law the 
resolution of which will speed the termination of the litigation. 
Secondly, in truly extraordinary cases, a writ of mandamus is 
available. We have had recourse to the writ of mandamus to protect 
first amendment rights where we feared that the Mohawk decision 
foreclosed collateral order appeals. Ferrell did not seek to avail 
himself of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), nor did he seek mandamus in this 
Court. We, therefore, express no opinion on how we might have 
decided such an appeal or application had one been brought. We 
conclude that an immediate appeal is not necessary to protect the 
rights in Nevada Revised Statute § 41.660.37 
We should thank the Ninth Circuit for this, because it seems to be 
almost inviting federal litigants to use these alternative mechanisms to 
get true anti-SLAPP protection, even if the Nevada legislature 
neglects to fortify the statute. Of course, this is of little comfort to a 
Nevada SLAPP victim if the plaintiff does not provide an opportunity 
to remove the matter to federal court. 
CONCLUSION 
While the disparities between the Nevada, California, and ever-
changing Oregon anti-SLAPP laws have made navigating the myriad 
of applicable federal procedures within the Ninth Circuit challenging, 
at least these states offer some degree of anti-SLAPP protection. 
Many states are completely devoid of laws that protect individuals 
from inappropriate lawsuits filed only to punish and censor their 
constitutionally protected speech. The need for a federal statute that 
would create a unified definition of a SLAPP suit and mechanism for 
disposing of them is clear and immediate. 
  
 
37 Metabolic, 693 F.3d at 803 (citations omitted). 
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